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Recently, our team at BVA was called in to assist a local Phoenix-based organization that had been hit by a .Play Cryptolocker ransomware attack. Unfortunately, this type of incident is becoming far too common for businesses of all sizes. What made this situation especially challenging—and instructive—was not just the ransomware itself, but the lack of proper backup isolation and recovery planning.

This incident serves as a strong reminder: ransomware is no longer a question of “if,” but “when.” The difference between a temporary disruption and a business-ending event often comes down to backup strategy and network design.

Understanding the .Play Cryptolocker Variant

The .Play ransomware (commonly referred to as Play or PlayCrypt) is a modern ransomware strain that encrypts files and appends the .play extension to affected data. Like many contemporary crypto-lockers, it typically:

• Uses strong encryption algorithms that make decryption infeasible without the attacker’s key
• Targets Windows environments, including file servers and shared network drives
• Spreads laterally once inside the network, often leveraging compromised credentials
• Actively seeks out and attempts to encrypt or delete backups

Once encryption is complete, victims are presented with a ransom note demanding payment—usually in cryptocurrency—in exchange for a supposed decryption key. There are no guarantees the attackers will actually restore data, and paying the ransom often funds further criminal activity.

What Went Wrong: A Real-World Scenario

In this Phoenix incident, the organization did have backups in place. Unfortunately, those backups were:

• Connected to the production network
• Accessible using the same credentials as daily operations
• Not protected by immutability or network segmentation

As a result, when the ransomware executed, it didn’t just encrypt live data—it encrypted the backups as well. This dramatically increased recovery time, cost, and operational impact.

This is a scenario we see repeatedly across small and mid-sized businesses: backups exist, but they aren’t resilient.

Why Viable Backups Are Non-Negotiable

A viable backup is more than just a copy of data. To be effective against ransomware, backups must be:

• Regularly tested for successful restoration
• Versioned, so clean copies exist from before the attack
• Protected from modification or deletion
• Monitored, with alerts for failures or anomalies

Backups should be treated as a critical security control, not just an IT convenience. Without them, organizations are left with only bad options: pay the ransom, rebuild from scratch, or potentially go out of business.

The Critical Importance of Backup Network Segregation

One of the biggest lessons from this incident was the importance of segregating backup infrastructure from production systems.

Best practices include:

• Placing backup systems on a separate network or VLAN
• Using separate credentials with strict access controls
• Implementing immutable backups that cannot be altered for a defined retention period
• Restricting administrative access using least-privilege principles
• Protecting backups with MFA and monitoring

When backups share the same trust boundary as production systems, ransomware treats them as just another target. Segregation ensures that even if production is compromised, recovery remains possible.

Defense in Depth: More Than Just Backups

While backups are critical, they are only one layer of a strong ransomware defense strategy. Organizations should also invest in:

• Endpoint detection and response (EDR)
• Email and phishing protection
• Patch management and vulnerability remediation
• User security awareness training
• Incident response planning and tabletop exercises

At BVA, we approach cybersecurity as a holistic, layered strategy, not a single tool or checkbox.

Turning a Crisis Into a Learning Opportunity

The Phoenix organization we assisted ultimately recovered—but not without significant downtime and stress. The experience reinforced an essential truth: ransomware preparedness must be proactive, not reactive.

With the right backup architecture, network segmentation, and security controls, ransomware incidents can be survivable events rather than catastrophic failures.

If there’s one takeaway from this .Play Cryptolocker incident, it’s this:

If your backups aren’t isolated, immutable, and tested—you don’t really have backups.